ᴜꜱɪɴɢ ᴅɪꜱᴀɢʀᴇᴇᴍᴇɴᴛ ᴀꜱ ᴀ ᴘʀᴏᴏꜰ ᴏꜰ ᴘᴇʀᴍɪꜱꜱɪʙɪʟɪᴛʏ

IbnMuhammad_Official Published Jun 2, 2026

Written by Shaykh Dr. Ayman bin Su’ūd al ‘Anqarī

10 / 7 / 1439 AH

All praise is due to Allah, Lord of the worlds, and may blessings and peace be upon our Prophet Muhammad, and upon his family and all his Companions. To proceed:

Indeed from the saddening things that have appeared within the ranks of those who ascribe themselves to steadfastness and goodness is an issue that has become widespread, rather even some who are affiliated with knowledge have begun to promote it, and it is the issue of using scholarly disagreement in opposition to the text (Qurān, Sunnah).

And the danger of this false approach lies in seeking opinions detached from their proofs, and in making the mere existence of disagreement itself a proof of legitimacy. Thus, these people have adopted acting upon this deviant methodology even when it contradicts sound and explicit evidence, all under the claim that there is “a difference of opinion” on the matter.

The issue did not stop with them rather, it extended to spreading this among the general public—men and women—thereby misleading them and becoming a cause for weakening the veneration of the shar’i evidence and following it.

Whenever an issue is mentioned, they say: “There is a difference of opinion.”

Congregational prayer? There is a difference of opinion. Musical instruments? There is a difference of opinion. A woman covering her face? There is a difference of opinion. Mixing between men and women? There is a difference of opinion. The obligation of letting the beard grow? There is a difference of opinion.

Some of the interest tricks practiced by certain banks under the false claim of “Islamic banking” such as converting a debt owed by a debtor into a commodity that is not actually intended for itself? They say: “There is a difference of opinion about it.” And other examples besides that…Thus many religious rulings become suspended under the banner of “disagreement.”

And the duty of denouncing evil and maintaining public accountability—enjoining good and forbidding evil—is also suspended in the name of disagreement. In reality, this amounts to deception toward Allah. And it is self-justification for falling into what is forbidden under the proof that there is a difference of opinion!

How many people have asked me about the ruling on certain issues, and I answered them according to what the evidence necessitates. Then some of them immediately say: “Is there a difference of opinion on the issue?!” So that he may use it as a proof to choose opinions based on his desires.

As one of them explicitly said: “We take the easier view even if it contradicts the evidence.” Therefore appealing to disagreement shares the same reality as the practice of following concessions by taking the easiest opinions, or as al Mardāwī expressed it: “Whenever he finds a concession in a school of thought, he acts upon it” as mentioned in al Tahbīr (8/4090). Because both share the practice of taking the easiest and lightest opinions without a valid weighing of evidence.

Sulaymān al Taymī said: “If you were to take the concession of every scholar, all evil would be gathered in you.”

Imam ibn ‘Abdul Barr commented on this statement in Jāmiʿ Bayān al ʿIlm wa Fadlihi (2/927), saying: “I do not know of any disagreement among the scholars regarding this.”

al Shātibī said in al Muwāfaqāt (5/99):

“Following concessions is an inclination toward personal desires, and the Sharī’ah came to prohibit following desires, so this contradicts that agreed-upon principle. And it contradicts His statement: ‘If you disagree over anything, refer it back to Allah and the Messenger…’ The place of disagreement is precisely the place of dispute, so it is not valid to refer it back to personal desires, rather, it must be referred back to the Sharīʿah, which clarifies the stronger of the two opinions, and that must be followed, not what suits one’s personal aim.”

Even though Allah, the Exalted and Most High, revealed the Qurān to judge between our disagreements, not for us to make disagreements judge over the Qurān.

Allah the Most High says: “And whatever you differ over—its ruling belongs to Allah” (Qurān 42: 10). And He, Exalted and Most High, said: “And if you disagree over anything, refer it to Allah and the Messenger, if you should believe in Allah and the Last Day. That is the best [way] and best in result.”(Qurān 4:59)

Rather, among the matters in which the scholars are specifically entrusted with is giving sincere advice as mentioned in the statement of the Prophet ﷺ: “The religion is sincere advice.” We said: “To whom?” He replied: “To Allah, His Book, His Messenger, the leaders of the Muslims, and their common people.”

Ibn Rajab said in Jāmi’ al-‘Ulūm wa al Hikam (1/97): “[Sincere advice includes] refuting misguided desires by means of the Book and the Sunnah, returning them to their source, and clarifying how both of them indicate that which contradicts all forms of desire, and likewise refuting weak statements that arise from the slips of scholars, and clarifying the indication of the Book and the Sunnah for rejecting them.”

And the meaning of using scholarly disagreement is to treat disagreement itself as proof that one may adopt whichever opinion he wishes in an issue, regardless of its basis or evidence, without sound preference (tarjīh) or following (taqlīd). What is meant by this is considering juristic disagreement in a matter as one of the proofs of permissibility, and relying on the permissibility of an issue merely because scholars differed over it.

Examples of using disagreement include:

1) declaring many interest deceptions permissible—such as allowing the conversion of a debt upon a debtor through a commodity not intended for its own sake, three-party ‘īnah transactions, charging late payment penalties on loans, and other than that.

2) declaring interest benefits to be permissible

3) permitting temporary marriage (mut’ah)

4) permitting singing and musical instruments

5) claiming that congregational prayer in the mosque is a Sunnah and not obligatory

6) permitting a woman to hold position of judge

7) allowing the making of statues

8) claiming that it is permissible for a woman to uncover her face, using the existence of the jurists’ disagreement as proof.

9) and permitting a man to shake hands with a non mahram woman.

The emergence of such statements from a muftī may be due to several causes, among them weakness of religiosity and fear of Allah, and love of prominence and fame especially when appearing on certain satellite channels in order to be described as “moderate,” “balanced,” and “not strict.”

Al Bājī one of the Mālikī jurists, condemned the repeated occurrence of this deviation among those seeking fatwā, attributing it to the scholars’ weak denunciation of it. He said: “Very often, someone who encounters an issue related to oaths or similar matters asks me: ‘Perhaps there is a transmitted view regarding it? Or perhaps there is a concession?’ They consider this to be something commonly accepted, permissible. Had the jurists repeatedly condemned such behavior, they would not have been inclined toward it, nor would they have sought it from me or from anyone else. This is something about which there is no disagreement among Muslims whose opinion counts in consensus: that it is not permissible, acceptable, or lawful for anyone to issue a fatwā in the religion of Allah except with what he believes to be the truth, whether people are pleased with it or angered by it. Indeed, the Muftī is conveying information on behalf of Allah regarding His ruling, so how can he convey on His behalf anything except what he believes Allah has ruled and made obligatory?” And Allah the Most High said: “And judge between them by what Allah has revealed and do not follow their desires” (Qurān 5:49). Al-Shāṭibī transmitted this in al-Muwāfaqāt (4/506–507).

Al Shātibī pointed to this issue in al Muwāfaqāt (4/141), saying:

“This matter has gone beyond what is sufficient, to the point that disagreement in issues has come to be counted among the proofs of permissibility, and in earlier and later times, people have relied upon the permissibility of an action merely because it is disputed among the scholars—not in the proper sense of considering disagreement, for that has a different scholarly framework, but in another way. Thus, a fatwā may be issued declaring a matter prohibited, and it is then said: ‘It has not been prohibited, since the issue has disagreement.’ So disagreement itself is made a proof for permissibility simply because the issue is disputed, not due to any evidence establishing the correctness of the permissive view, nor due to following one who is more deserving of being followed than the one who held the view of prohibition. This is the very essence of error with respect to the Sharī’ah, for it treats what is not authoritative as authoritative, and what is not a proof as a proof.”

I [Shaykh Ayman al ‘Anqarī] say: many scholars have stated that it is prohibited to use disagreement as a proof. Some of them have even transmitted consensus on this matter. Among them is Ibn ‘Abdul Barr, who said in Jāmiʿ Bayān al ‘Ilm wa Fadlihi “Disagreement is not a proof according to any jurist of the Ummah whom I know—except one who has no insight, no knowledge, and whose statement carries no authority.” Al Zarkashī The well-known Usūlī scholar said in his distinguished work on Usūl al Fiqh, al Bahr al Muhīt (4/550): “Know that disagreement itself does not constitute a valid doubt and is not to be considered rather, consideration is given to the basis of the opinion and the strength of its evidence.”

Meaning: disagreement itself is not taken into account; rather, one looks to whether the evidence is strong or not.

Ibn al Salāh in Ādāb al Fatwā wa Shurūt al Muftī (p. 87):

“Know that whoever is content, in his fatwā or practice, merely with conforming to some opinion or view in an issue, and acts upon whatever opinions or views he wishes without consideration of preference or binding himself to it, has indeed acted ignorantly and violated consensus and this is something about which there is no disagreement among Muslims whose consensus counts, that it is not permissible.”

Shaykh al Islām ibn Taymiyyah said in Majmūʿ al Fatāwā (26/202):

“No one has the right to use the statement of any person as proof in matters of dispute. Rather, the proof is the revealed text, consensus, and evidence derived from them, whose premises are established by shar’i evidences, not by the statements of some scholars. For the statements of scholars are supported by the shar’i evidences, and they are not used as proofs against the shar’i evidences.”

The Mālikī ibn al ‘Arabī said in al ‘Awāsim min al Qawāsim (p. 256): “If we were to take into consideration every disagreement that arises, the religion would never settle upon any principle.”

And what he means is abandoning acting upon the revealed texts by appealing to disagreement—even if that disagreement is odd or weak.

And from these quotations, it becomes clear that appealing to disagreement and elevating it to the status of shar’i proof is following one’s desires and personal inclinations. And in this meaning, it is opposed to the Sharī’ah, which is meant to divert the responsible person from following his whims, so that he may be a servant of Allah, revering His law. Thus, in reality, an issue is either a followed law or an obeyed desire. And we find this is made explicit in Allah’s statement: “O David, We have made you a successor on the earth, so judge between the people in truth and do not follow desire, lest it mislead you from the way of Allah.” (Qurān 38:26)

Al Shātibī, the scholar of the objectives of the Sharī’ah, has precious speech on this matter: “When a layperson brings his difficulty to the Muftī, he is in effect saying: ‘Remove me from my desire and guide me to follow the truth.

’ It is not permissible, in this case, for the Muftī to say to him: ‘There are two opinions on your matter choose whichever suits your desire,’ for this would mean making desire the judge rather than the Islāmic legislation.”

And here is a phrase we sometimes hear from people who justify committing sins with the claim: “There is no condemnation in matters of disagreement.” In truth, this statement is not correct in general. Shaykh al-Islām Ibn Taymiyyah invalidated this generalization in Bayān al Dalīl ‘ala Batālat al Tahlīl (pp. 159–160) saying:

Their claim that ‘there is no condemnation in matters of disagreement’ is not correct, for condemnation is either directed at a statement regarding the ruling or at an action. As for the first case: if the statement contradicts a Sunnah or an established consensus, it must be objected to accordingly… And if there is no Sunnah or consensus on the matter and there is scope for ijtihād, no objection is made to one who acts upon it, whether he is an Mujtahid or a follower. And verily the confusion arises when someone believes that all matters of disagreement are automatically matters of ijtihād.”

The very important question is: what are the dangerous consequences of using disagreement and making it a proof of permissibility?

I say: this can be summarized as follows:

1) Permitting everything over which the Ummah has not agreed upon prohibition. This would make disagreement a basis for permissibility in all matters, since most issues contain differences of opinion, allowing nothing to be prohibited except what the Ummah has unanimously agreed upon. This is false by consensus. Ibn Hazm said in al Ihkām fī Usūl al Ahkām (2/80): “If a matter were only accepted according to what the Ummah has agreed upon, and what they disagreed upon—even when there are textual evidences—were abandoned, he would be considered a sinner by consensus of the Ummah.”

2) Abandoning adherence to textual and Shar’i evidence and following one’s desires and whims. This leads to merely looking at the sayings of scholars and adopting whichever one one wishes, without considering the evidence, and treating disagreement itself as proof, elevating it to the status of recognized legal evidence.

Al Shātibī pointed this out in al Muwāfaqāt (4/508), saying: “Whoever says this is intending to follow whatever he desires and makes the saying that suits him a proof for himself to justify it, he has taken the opinion as a means to follow his desire, not as a means toward piety.”

3) Following the concessions of the juristic schools, the odd statements of jurists, and their slips. Scholars have explicitly stated that such conduct is sinful. Scholars have explicitly stated that one who follows concessions is sinful. Imam Ahmad said in al-Maswadah (pp. 518–519):

“If a man were to act upon every concession—according to the opinion of the people of Madīnah regarding listening (to singing), according to the people of Kūfah regarding Nabīdh (type of alcoholic drink), and according to the people of Makkah regarding temporary marriage he would be considered a sinner.”

Ibn al-Najjār al Fatūhī al-Hanbalī said in Sharh al Kawkab al Munīr (4/577–578):

“And it is forbidden for him—the layperson—to follow concessions, meaning that whenever he finds a concession in a school of thought, he acts upon it and does not act by other opinions within that school, and he becomes sinful thereby… for no scholar of the Muslims has said that all concessions are permissible. The one who permits a concession in this school of thought does not permit the other concessions found in other schools.”

4) Being lax regarding prohibitions established by the Sharī’ah and abandoning the religion, which weakens the meaning of devotion in the Sharī’ah. And this leads a person to seek out any odd or false saying in order to justify committing what is forbidden.

5) Abandoning enjoining good and forbidding evil toward someone who has committed a sin. All this is done under the claim that the issue is “disputed.”

This is among the most invalid arguments, making no distinction between one who follows the Islāmic legislation and one who follows his own whims and desires.

And Allah knows that I wrote these words only when I saw people whose outward appearance was steadfastness slip into the mire of forbidden acts, under the pretext that the matter is disputed.

Some began neglecting congregational prayer in the mosque after previously being keen to pray in the first row. Some became lax in listening to songs, and some devout women began to be lax by uncovering their faces, claiming disagreement as proof. Some began shaking hands with non-mahram women. Some became lax in engaging in dealings involving interest tricks, such as ‘īnah transactions and debt conversions in installment and financing stores… and the list goes on.

I ask Allah to keep us steadfast in His religion until we meet Him, without changing or altering it, in times of trials, upheavals, setbacks, and changes. And may Allah’s blessings and peace be upon our Prophet Muhammad, and upon his family and companions.

“ᴍᴀʏ ᴀʟʟᴀʜ ʀᴇᴡᴀʀᴅ ᴛʜᴇ ꜱᴄʜᴏʟᴀʀꜱ ᴏꜰ ᴀʜʟᴜꜱ ꜱᴜɴɴᴀʜ ᴡʜᴏ ᴄʟᴀʀɪꜰɪᴇᴅ ᴛʜᴇ ᴛʀᴜᴛʜ ᴀɴᴅ ᴇxᴘᴏꜱᴇᴅ ꜰᴀʟꜱᴇʜᴏᴏᴅ, ᴀɴᴅ ᴍᴀʏ ʜᴇ ᴍᴀᴋᴇ ᴜꜱ ᴀᴍᴏɴɢ ᴛʜᴏꜱᴇ ᴡʜᴏ ʟɪꜱᴛᴇɴ, ᴜɴᴅᴇʀꜱᴛᴀɴᴅ, ᴀɴᴅ ꜰᴏʟʟᴏᴡ.”